The U.S. Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Abandonment of Applicable International Norms by Graham, David E.
Texas A&M Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 4 
2015 
The U.S. Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An 
Abandonment of Applicable International Norms 
David E. Graham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David E. Graham, The U.S. Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Abandonment of 
Applicable International Norms, 2 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 675 (2015). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V2.I4.4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL410.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-MAR-16 10:37
THE U.S. EMPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs):
AN ABANDONMENT OF APPLICABLE
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
By: David E. Graham*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676 R
II. UAV CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677 R
III. INTERNATIONAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO THE
EMPLOYMENT OF UAVS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678 R
A. The UAV as a Weapon Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678 R
B. Assessing the Legal Bases for the Use of Force
Employment of UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 R
1. UAV Employment in an Ongoing Armed
Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 R
2. UAV Employment in Non-Armed Conflict
Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 R
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR THE USE OF FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 R
A. The United Nations Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 R
B. The Customary Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense . . 682 R
V. U.S. UAV USE OUTSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 682 R
A. U.S. Congressional Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF)–2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683 R
B. U.S. Legal Bases for the Use of UAVs Outside
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683 R
1. U.S. Engagement in a “Global Armed Conflict”
With al-Qaeda and Associated Forces . . . . . . . . . . 683 R
2. If Not an Armed Conflict-How About the Right
of Self-Defense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687 R
VI. LOAC:  THE “HOW” COMPONENT OF APPLICABLE USE
OF FORCE PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690 R
VII. SOVEREIGNTY:  A CASUALTY OF U.S. LEGAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UAV EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691 R
VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693 R
* Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School,
U.S. Army. J.D., University of Texas; M.A., George Washington University; B.A.,
Texas A&M University.  Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army.  Formerly, Chief, Interna-
tional and Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Depart-
ment of the Army, and Director, Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army.  The author has prepared
this article in his personal capacity and does not purport to represent the views of the
Department of Defense, The Department of the Army, or The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral’s Legal Center and School.
675
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V2.I4.4
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL410.txt unknown Seq: 2 11-MAR-16 10:37
676 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of the Texas A&M Law Review Symposium serving as
the genesis for this edition of the Law Review was that of “New Tech-
nology and Old Law-Rethinking National Security.”  While identify-
ing a clearly topical and timely issue, this Symposium title also
appeared to reflect an inherent doubt regarding the ability of the ex-
isting, i.e., the old law, to effectively regulate the employment of cer-
tain elements of 21st century technology for national security
purposes.  Indeed, the use of old to describe the current legal regime
relevant to such technology was, in and of itself, somewhat pejorative
in nature.  The obvious implication to be drawn, then:  It was the goal
of the Law Review to foster a critical examination of whether existing
international legal norms remained relevant to controlling the na-
tional security use of certain technological advances.  And, as re-
flected by the Symposium agenda, the specific technology to be
assessed was that of cyber—and its national security component—
cyber warfare, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also re-
ferred to as drones, or, as designated by the U.S. Air Force, remotely
piloted aircraft.  This latter form of technology is the subject of this
article.
Much has been written over the past several years regarding the
increased U.S. employment of UAVs as a weapon system against both
combatants on a battlefield and terrorists far removed from an active
zone of military operations.  As an element of this dialogue, there has
occurred a growing discussion as to whether, given what some view as
the appearance of new threats to national security—existing in the
form of al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations—there is now a
need for enhanced clarity and transparency concerning the legal prin-
ciples applicable to when, where, and how such systems might be
used.1  The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, if, in fact,
uncertainty exists as to the legal norms to be applied in the employ-
ment of UAVs against those who threaten U.S. security interests—it is
an uncertainty of a U.S. self-inflicted nature.  In truth, the old law, i.e.,
currently existing codified and customary international legal princi-
ples, can quite sufficiently regulate the lawful use of these systems.
Any confusion surrounding this subject is, in reality, due to the con-
sistently self-serving and highly questionable manner in which the
U.S. government has both interpreted and applied these norms.
Before turning to a discussion of the relevant legal issues, however, it
1. BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION:  HOW TO ENSURE THAT THE
U.S. DRONE PROGRAM DOES NOT UNDERMINE HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST 2 (2013), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/
blueprints2012/HRF_Targeted_Killing_blueprint.pdf; David Ignatius, Dazzling New
Weapons Require New Rules for War, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2010, at A5, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/10/AR2010111005500
.html.
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would be helpful to briefly examine the basic nomenclature of com-
monly U.S.-deployed UAVs.
II. UAV CAPABILITIES
The U.S. Department of Defense has over 10,000 UAVs in its inven-
tory, with the vast majority of these being used for surveillance and
intelligence gathering, rather than for targeting purposes.  They range
in size from the one-pound Wasp to the fifteen-ton Global Hawk.
Thousands were used in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater of opera-
tions, and included those so small that they could be carried by Army
and Marine Corps personnel and tossed like footballs in order to peer
beyond the horizon.  Spy drones—micro UAVs the size of pizza plat-
ters capable of monitoring potential targets at a very close range for
days at a time—were frequently used.  At night, these systems are al-
most impossible to detect.2
The UAVs that constantly have been in the news, however, are the
Predator and its larger cousin, the Reaper.  For, while also used for
surveillance purposes, these are the systems that have been used as
the primary weapon platforms for strike missions.  The Predator is
twenty-seven feet long, powered, essentially, by a high-performance
snowmobile engine, produced at a cost of approximately $4.5 million.
Given the fact that a modern fighter aircraft carries a price tag of over
$140 million, the Predator is a very economical product.  The newest
version of the Reaper is both larger and faster than the Predator, trav-
eling up to 250 miles per hour, and capable of beaming back up to 65
video images to its operator.  Indeed, troops on the ground are able to
see what the Reaper sees—in real time—and can actually query the
Reaper in operational situations.  These systems can effectively linger
over and surveil an area for more than twenty hours at a time.  As a
result, in Afghanistan, they were able to provide continuous protec-
tion—and an exceptionally broad view of their surroundings—to both
Army and Marine personnel, again—in real-time.  They also identi-
fied Taliban fighters, monitored their weapon storehouses, their
routes into and out of an area, and mapped their roadside bombs.
U.S. Special Forces elements used these UAVs to attack the Taliban
leadership and their bomb-making networks—often by stacking two
to three of these systems over a single compound and monitoring, on
a 24-7 basis, all who entered and departed the area.3
2. LYNN E. DAVIS ET AL., ARMED AND DANGEROUS?:  UAVS AND U.S. SECUR-
ITY 7 (2014).
3. Joby Warrick & Peter Finn, In Pakistan, CIA Refines Methods to Reduce Civil-
ian Deaths, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2010, at A8; Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weap-
ons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at A4, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Walter
Pincus, Air Force Training More Pilots for Drones Than for Manned Planes, WASH.
POST, Aug. 11, 2009, at A18; Christopher Drew, Drones Are Playing a Growing Role
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When the Predator and Reaper are used for strike missions, they
are generally fitted with two types of missiles.  The Hellfire II weighs
over 100 pounds, is 64 inches in length, has a range of five miles, and
can be fitted with a variety of warheads.  The Scorpion, in contrast,
weighs less than 35 pounds, is 21 inches in length (about the size of a
violin case), has a diameter approximately the size of a coffee cup, and
is capable of striking objectives at up to 10 miles.  It also can be fitted
with four different guidance systems, a feature that ensures exception-
ally accurate targeting.  It can, in fact, strike a single individual—in
darkness.4
An extensive amount of information regarding the various types of
UAVs and their consistently upgraded operational capabilities is avail-
able in the public domain.5  Suffice it to say that these systems have
become increasingly sophisticated on an ongoing basis, proving to be
ideally suited for waging counter-insurgency and, more recently,
counter-terrorism campaigns.  A note of caution is required, however.
These platforms are, indeed, extraordinarily effective when operating
in air space over which the U.S. maintains complete air superiority.  If
forced to perform in operational situations where this is not the case,
UAVs are particularly vulnerable.  Moreover, since 2001, more than
400 of these systems have crashed in major accidents around the
world, due to mechanical breakdowns, human error, bad weather, and
for other unexplained reasons.6  Given these factors, the operational
effectiveness of UAVs as weapon platforms in a conventional conflict
would be substantially limited.
III. INTERNATIONAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO THE
EMPLOYMENT OF UAVS
A. The UAV as a Weapon Platform
There exists no uncertainty surrounding the legality of the UAV as a
weapon system.  It is simply one of any number of weapon platforms,
such as the F-16 and Tomahawk Missile, available for use by the U.S.
when a decision is made to engage in a kinetic strike against a target.
Indeed, as later discussion will detail, from both a legal and opera-
tional perspective, the use of this particular platform will most proba-
bly ensure enhanced target certainty, greater accuracy, and very
importantly, reduced collateral damage—an always sought after
result.
in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html.
4. Warrick & Finn, supra note 3, at A8.
5. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–15.  As noted, these UAV systems continue to
become increasingly sophisticated.  Their current capabilities are classified in nature.
6. See id. at 13.
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B. Assessing the Legal Bases for the Use of Force
Employment of UAVs
If, in fact, the UAV is an undeniably lawful weapon system, why all
of the controversy surrounding its use, as well as the numerous calls
for clarification of the confusion regarding the current legal norms as
to when, where, and how it might be employed?  The answer to this
question lies in the fact that the real issue at play here has never been
the legitimacy of the UAV.  The criticism associated with its use has
actually been driven by a perception of the faulty nature of the legal
bases provided by the U.S. government for its engagement in certain
use of force actions utilizing a UAV as the weapon platform of choice.
This perception is grounded in the belief, which I share, that when the
U.S. government—and, particularly a certain element of the govern-
ment, i.e., the CIA—launches UAV strikes against singular targets—
specifically individuals, or small groups of individuals (the latter of
whom may or may not have been positively identified)—in locations
distant from an active theater of military operations, it is often acting
in violation of the universally recognized  codified and customary
norms of Jus ad Bellum—those conflict management principles that
dictate when and where a State might resort to the use of force be-
yond its territorial boundaries.7  It is these use of force concerns,
rather than an actual belief in the illegitimacy of the UAV as a weapon
system, that has fueled the criticism of its use.  Simply put, due to the
fact that the UAV has been seen as a much more cost-effective, risk-
averse, and, thus, very attractive first option for engaging in the types
of use of force operations in issue, it has become, in essence, the
poster child for those who would challenge the legitimacy of such ac-
tions.  Accordingly, it is in this context that I turn to a discussion of my
previously stated contention that the old law, i.e., the currently ex-
isting international legal norms—if not ignored, misinterpreted, or
misapplied—are quite up to the task of effectively regulating when,
where, and how a UAV might be employed.
1. UAV Employment in an Ongoing Armed Conflict
No controversy is associated with the when and where aspects of the
employment of UAVs when these systems are deployed, by military
personnel, in the midst of an active combat zone.  For example, in
Afghanistan, UAVs were operated by members of the U.S. armed
forces in, indisputably, the context of an ongoing armed conflict.8  In
7. For a well-considered discussion of these principles and their application to the
U.S. use of UAVs, see Rosa Brooks, Drones and the International Rule of Law, 28
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 83 (2014).
8. There existed a universal consensus that, when initiated, the armed conflict in
Afghanistan was international in nature.  When a new Afghan government was in-
stalled, U.S. coalition partners came to view the continuing hostilities in Afghanistan
as a non-international armed conflict.  The U.S., however, continued to characterize
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that case, the when and where Jus ad Bellum principles associated with
the legitimacy of the U.S. use of force were considered and acted upon
appropriately.  The UN Security Council had specifically recognized
that terrorist attacks could trigger a right to use force in self-defense
and, at least implicitly, had approved the U.S. operation in Afghani-
stan.  In passing Security Council Resolution 1368, just a day after the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the Council noted that “such acts, like any act of
international terrorism [constitute] . . . a threat to international peace
and security.”9  In doing so, it also reaffirmed “the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”10
This, and several subsequent Resolutions,11 were seen by the U.S. and
the great majority of the international community as sanctioning the
lawful use of force by the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan.  Addition-
ally, there was a consensus among commentators that this U.S./NATO
campaign represented a valid instance of individual and collective self-
defense.12  And, very importantly, on December 30, 2001, the Security
Council authorized the creation of the International Security Assis-
tance Force (“ISAF”), an act that served to place the war in Afghani-
stan under the formal umbrella of a Security Council-authorized use
of force.13  In the context of this sanctioned use of force, the UAV was
thus viewed as but one of a number of legitimate weapon platforms
being used by the U.S. and its coalition partners.
Left to be considered in this armed conflict scenario, however, is the
matter of whether the old, the existing law, effectively addresses how
the UAV might be employed in such an environment.  In making this
assessment, we need only to turn to the customary Law of Armed
Conflict (“LOAC”) principles applicable to any targeting decision:
those of military necessity, distinction/discrimination, proportionality,
and unnecessary suffering.14  In brief, these norms dictate that, when
these ongoing hostilities with the Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda as an interna-
tional-armed conflict.
9. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, U.N. SCOR, 4370th Meeting, U.N. Document S/RES/1368
(Sept. 12, 2001).
10. Id. at ¶ 3.
11. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept.
28, 2001); S.C. Res.1377, U.N. SCOR, 4413th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov.
12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 4413th Meeting, 4413th Meeting, U.N. Doc.S/
RES/1378 (Nov. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 4434th Meeting, U.N. Doc.S/
RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001); and S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 4443rd Meeting, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).
12. See Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments, Terrorism and the Right of Self-
Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839–43 (2001).
13. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 11, at ¶ 4.
14. These principles are defined as follows:  (1) Military necessity “justifies those
measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the
complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.” OPERATIONAL LAW HAND-
BOOK, INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL
CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY 11 (2014).  This principle must be applied in conjunction
with other LOAC principles, as well as other, more specific, legal constraints set forth
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selecting UAV targets, civilians must be distinguished from combat-
ants, military objectives must be distinguished from protected places
and property, and that collateral damage incurred, if any, must not be
disproportionate to the military advantage reasonably expected to be
gained.
In sum, with respect to the use of UAVs in an ongoing-armed-con-
flict scenario, it is clear that the currently existing international norms
are fully capable of effectively regulating when, where, and how these
systems might be utilized.
2. UAV Employment in Non-Armed Conflict Scenarios
It is the U.S. government’s recent use of UAVs in what would ap-
pear to be non-armed conflict scenarios that has given rise to numer-
ous questions concerning the validity of such actions when measured
against the widely acknowledged international law regulating when
and where a State might engage in the use of force.  Indeed, it is this
disconnect between U.S. UAV employment and the existing law appli-
cable to such that has led some to challenge the continued utility of
this old law—and to call for a clarification of the confusion generated
by an attempt to assess the lawfulness of U.S. actions in the context of
current international principles.  In order to more readily understand
this increasingly evident gap between U.S. actions and the relevant
legal principles at play, it is essential to engage in a brief review of the
recognized Jus ad Bellum norms that dictate when and where a State
might resort to the use of force abroad.
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR THE USE OF FORCE
A. The United Nations Charter
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter is universally
viewed as a prohibition on the use of force by a State within the terri-
torial boundaries of another State.15  Only two exceptions to this pro-
in LOAC international agreements to which the U.S. is a party.  (2) Distinction,
“sometimes referred to as the principle of discrimination . . . requires that belligerents
distinguish combatants from civilians and military objectives from civilian objects (i.e.,
protected property or places).” Id. at 12.  (3) Proportionality “requires that the antici-
pated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.” Id.
at 13.  This principle is not a separate legal standard as such, but provides a method by
which a balance can be struck between military necessity and civilian loss or damage
when an attack might cause incidental damage to civilian personnel or property.  (4)
Unnecessary suffering, “sometimes referred to as the principle of ‘superfluous injury’
or ‘humanity,’ requires that military forces avoid inflicting gratuitous violence on the
enemy.” Id. at 14.
15. U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”).
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hibition are set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter.  The first of these
occurs when the Security Council identifies “any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”16  If such a determination is
made, the Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity.”17  The second exception occurs in the form of a State’s right to
use force for self-defense purposes.  Article 51 of the Charter states,
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
As previously discussed, it was this Council-sanctioned right of self-
defense that served as the legal basis for the initiation of the U.S./
NATO armed conflict waged in Afghanistan.
B. The Customary Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense
There exists substantial agreement among States and international
lawyers/scholars that an inherent, customary right of self-defense has
transcended that of the relatively restrictive codified Article 51 right
of a State to use force to defend itself against an armed attack.18  In-
deed, a consensus has increasingly coalesced around the existence of
such a right, given the ongoing difficulty in defining what does, and
does not, constitute an armed attack in the 21st century.  This custom-
ary right of anticipatory self-defense is said to exist when the threat
posed, and thus the necessity of self-defense, is “instantaneous, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation.”19
V. U.S. UAV USE OUTSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN
As noted, most, if not all, of the criticism leveled against the recent
U.S. employment of UAVs has centered on the legal arguments
mounted by the U.S. for its use of these weapon platforms outside the
active combat zone of Afghanistan.  These legal justifications have
consisted of both a U.S. creation of a completely new form of armed
conflict, giving rise to what it considers an ongoing, continuous right
16. U.N. Charter art. 39.
17. U.N. Charter art. 42.
18. U.N. Charter art. 51.
19. The most widely accepted standard for determining when a threat is imminent,
thus justifying the use of force, is the Caroline doctrine, arising from an incident in
1842, when British soldiers crossed into the U.S. in order to destroy a U.S ship carry-
ing arms to insurgents in Canada.  British and American officials, at the time, agreed
in an exchange of Diplomatic Notes, that the use of defensive force is permitted when
“the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.” See 2 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906); see also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150–52 (2d ed. 1991).
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to resort to the use of force on a global scale, and a re-interpretation of
an existing international norm regulating when and where a State
might use force in self-defense.
A. U.S. Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF)–2001
Before moving to a discussion of the U.S.-proffered legal theories
justifying its expanded use of UAVs, it is necessary to briefly assess
the impact on this discussion of the often cited, and currently debated,
2001 U.S. congressional joint resolution authorizing then President
Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons that he determined planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of 9/11-or that harbored such
organizations or persons.20  Such an analysis can be accomplished in
short order when, in doing so, it is recognized that the  AUMF is a
purely U.S. legislative instrument—serving exclusively as a domestic
law authorization for a U.S. president to commit U.S. armed forces to
the projection of force abroad.  It affords absolutely no legal basis,
from an international law perspective, for any U.S. use of force action
undertaken in another State, to include a use of force involving the
deployment of a UAV.
B. U.S. Legal Bases for the Use of UAVs Outside Afghanistan
1. U.S. Engagement in a “Global Armed Conflict” With al-Qaeda
and Associated Forces
The U.S. legal justification for its use of force outside of Afghani-
stan; that is, its deployment of UAVs as weapon systems in non-armed
conflict scenarios, hinges substantially on its contention that, since 9/
11, it has, in fact, been continuously engaged in a global armed conflict
with al-Qaeda and its associated forces.21  Accordingly, in the view of
20. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
21. President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense University on
drone and counterterrorism policy, Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy (May 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-
policy.html).  In this speech, the President asserted that:  “Under domestic law, and
international law, the United States is at war with al-Qaeida, the Taliban, and their
associated forces.” Id.; see also Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school-law (“Be-
cause the United States is in an armed conflict, we are authorized to take action
against enemy belligerents under international law. . . .  None of this is changed by the
fact that we are not in a conventional war.”); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adher-
ing to Our Values and Laws, Remarks at Harvard Law School Program on Law and
Security (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/re-
marks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.  A speech
in which Mr. Brennan stated, “We are at war with al Qa’ida.  In an indisputable act of
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the U.S., its use of UAVs has not occurred in non-conflict environ-
ments, but, instead, in the context of this ongoing armed conflict.
Moreover, the U.S. has further asserted that, given this reality, as en-
emy combatants, albeit unlawful enemy combatants, members of al-
Qaeda and its associated forces are subject to being targeted by U.S.
UAVs, wherever and whenever they might be found.22
An assessment of the validity of this U.S. global armed conflict
claim reveals that, post-9/11, an almost universal consensus existed
that though launched by a non-State entity, the 9/11 al-Qaeda strikes
constituted an armed attack against the U.S.  It was reasoned that
these acts represented but the latest al-Qaeda activities that, when col-
lectively considered, amounted to an ongoing armed attack against
U.S. interests—one dating back to the initial bombing of the New
York World Trade Center in 1993, and including the 1998 bombing of
the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the
USS Cole in Yemen.
Importantly, however, despite the Bush Administration’s subse-
quent unilateral declaration of its Global War on Terrorism23—to in-
clude, of course, al-Qaeda and its associated forces—the UN
demonstrated no support for the proposition that, even given the
scope and destructiveness of the 9/11 al-Qaeda strikes, these actions
triggered the initiation of an armed conflict between the U.S. and a
aggression, al-Qa’ida attacked our nation and killed nearly 3,000 innocent people.”
Id.  Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administra-
tion and International Law, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Soci-
ety of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm (submitting that “as a matter of international law, the United States is in
an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in re-
sponse to the horrific 9/11 attacks”).
22. Significant debate has centered around the manner in which the U.S. govern-
ment defines “associated force,” given that it has asserted that it is engaged in an
armed conflict with, and has the right to target, both members of al-Qaeda and its
“associated forces.”  The most straightforward explanation of the government’s inter-
pretation of this term was offered, in 2012, by then  Department of Defense General
Counsel, Jeh Johnson:
An “associated force,” as we interpret the phrase, has two characteristics
to it:  (1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al-
Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.  In other words, the group must not
only be aligned with al-Qaeda.  It must have also entered the fight against
the United States or its coalition partners.  Thus, an “associated force” is not
any terrorist group in the world that merely embraces the al-Qaeda ideol-
ogy.  More is required before we draw the legal conclusion that the group
fits the statutory authorization for the use of military force passed by the
Congress in 2001.
Jeh Johnson, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and
Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Speech at Yale Law School (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school/.
23. See generally Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (military order of Nov.
13, 2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL410.txt unknown Seq: 11 11-MAR-16 10:37
2015] UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 685
transnational terrorist organization.  The UN Security Council, on
September 12, 2001, unanimously adopted a resolution condemning
“the . . . terrorist attacks” of 9/11, which the Council regarded, “like
any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace
and security. . . .”24  On September 28, the Council also unanimously
adopted, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a U.S.-sponsored res-
olution obligating all member states to deny financing, support, and
safe haven to terrorists.25  Additionally, each of these resolutions af-
firmed, in the context of the events of 9/11, the inherent right of both
individual and collective self-defense, as well as the need “to combat
by all means” the “threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts.”26  Significantly, however, while these resolutions
made repeated references to terrorist attacks and international terror-
ism, conspicuously absent was any UN reference to—or recognition
of—the existence of an armed conflict between al-Qaeda and the U.S.
triggered by the events of 9/11.
Despite this UN lack of recognition of the existence of an ongoing
global armed conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda and its associ-
ated forces, the U.S. has doggedly and consistently clung to the con-
tention that, indeed, it has been waging an armed conflict with, among
others, militants in Pakistan, suspected al-Qaeda associates in Yemen,
members of the al-Shabaab Organization in Somalia, as well as other
groups and individuals.  In doing so, the U.S. has continued to main-
tain the position that it is possible for an armed conflict to exist be-
tween a State and one, or even more, non-State entities—even if these
entities are not publicly identified, their membership criteria not
clearly defined, they lack a clear structural organization, and their ac-
tivities are widely dispersed, geographically.  Accordingly, it has ar-
gued, members of these entities, as unlawful enemy combatants
engaged in an armed conflict with the U.S., may, as a result of their
status alone, be targeted by U.S. UAVs when and wherever they might
be discovered—State sovereignty notwithstanding.27
Not surprisingly, the existence of this unilaterally conceived form of
armed conflict has found minimal support within the international
community.  Disagreement with the U.S. position on this matter is
captured in a recently published European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Report, which noted that most legal scholars and courts “[reject]
the notion of a de-territorialised global armed conflict between the
U.S. and al Qaeda.”28  This position was said to be based on the belief
24. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 9.
25. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11.
26. S.C. Res. 1368 supra note 9; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11.
27. See Obama, supra note 21; Holder, supra note 21; Brennan, supra note 21;
Koh, supra note 21.
28. Anthony Dworkin, European Council on Foreign Relations, Drones and
Targeted Killing:  Defining a European Position, at 7 (July 2013), available at www
.ecfr.eu/page/-ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf.
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that a “confrontation between a State and a non-State group only rises
to the level of an armed conflict if the non-State group meets a thresh-
old for organization . . . there are intense hostilities between the two
parties . . . . [and] fighting [is] concentrated within a specific zone (or
zones) of hostilities.”29
A rejoinder often heard, within the U.S., to this essentially universal
rejection of the U.S. contention that it is free to make UAV targeting
decisions based on the existence of its ongoing armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, is this:  “But, the U.S. Supreme Court opined, in its 2006
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, that Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions did, in fact, apply to the ‘relevant conflict’ be-
tween the U.S. and al-Qaeda—an obviously definitive confirmation of
the existence of such an armed conflict.”30  This contention fails for
two distinct reasons.  First, the Hamdan decision reflects both a misin-
terpretation and misapplication of Common Article 3 by the Court, in
that the Court’s reasoning ignored, collectively, the plain language of
Article 3, the official Geneva Convention commentary dealing with
the meaning of this article, and the long and well-practiced manner in
which this article has been interpreted and applied, since its inception,
by the international community—to include the U.S.31  Taken to its
illogical conclusion, the Court’s interpretation of Article 3 would have
the U.S. engaged in an ongoing global, non-international armed con-
flict, against a transnational terrorist organization. Secondly, and even
more importantly, as in the case of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Su-
preme Court cannot, unilaterally, create or obviate customary interna-
tional norms or render an interpretation of a multilateral international
agreement binding upon other parties.
While it is clear that the U.S. contention that it can select UAV
targets based on its involvement in a continuing global armed conflict
with al-Qaeda finds no support in international law, significantly, the
U.S., has, in this context, consistently stated that, when it does engage
a target, it complies with the currently existing—and previously dis-
cussed—LOAC principles applicable to any targeting decision.32
Thus, while certain Jus ad Bellum norms relevant to “when” and
“where” a State might use force have largely been misapplied—or ig-
nored—by the U.S. in asserting its right to strike al-Qaeda and other
“associated” targets, worldwide, it purports to have abided by the ex-
isting Jus in Bello norms regulating the “how” aspects of target
engagement.
29. Id.
30. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 718–19 (2006).
31. JEAN DE PRUEX ET AL., GENEVA:  INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 36–37 (Pictet, Jean S., ed., 1960).
32. See supra note 14 (discussing these principles).
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This U.S. submission that it adheres to the currently existing LOAC
principles relevant to targeting considerations in waging what it sub-
mits to be a “global armed conflict” does not mean, of course, that it
has correctly applied these norms in all cases of target prosecution—a
matter that will later be discussed.  Moreover, though not directly ger-
mane to the thesis of this article, by insisting that its UAV strikes are
undertaken, outside of Afghanistan, in the context of an ongoing
armed conflict, the U.S. use of non-military (CIA) personnel to con-
duct many of these strikes raises the issue, among others, as to
whether such personnel are, in fact, functioning as unlawful
combatants.33
2. If Not an Armed Conflict-How About the Right of Self-
Defense?
The alternative legal basis consistently put forward by the U.S. for
its right to engage in UAV strikes in locations apart from an active-
armed-conflict zone has been one of self-defense.  Prior to assessing
the elements of this argument, however, it is important to note that
this use of dual legal justifications for the U.S. right to employ force,
in the form of UAV strikes, has carried with it significant ramifica-
tions.  Removed from an armed conflict context, members of al-Qaeda
and its associated forces can no longer be targeted on the basis of their
status alone, i.e., as unlawful enemy combatants.  These individuals
now become terrorists.  Accordingly, U.S. UAV strikes against such
personnel now occur as an integral element of an ongoing U.S.
counterterrorism campaign.  Other substantive considerations come
into play, as well.  Do LOAC targeting principles remain applicable to
UAV strikes conducted in a self-defense, vice armed conflict, mode?
Do third States now have to provide their specific consent to U.S.
UAV strikes conducted against terrorists operating within their terri-
tory?  Can the stigma of unlawful combatant now be removed from
CIA personnel who participate in self-defense, UAV strikes?  Little
wonder that these competing legal theories have generated confusion
concerning the applicability of existing international norms to the cur-
rent U.S. use of UAVs.
The self-defense theory posed—and implemented by—the U.S. rep-
resents a unique interpretation of a well-established Jus ad Bellum
principle, as it has appeared in a substantially altered form of the cus-
tomary right of anticipatory self-defense.  Recall that this anticipatory
33. “Unprivileged enemy belligerents, also referred to as unlawful combatants, may
include spies, saboteurs, or civilians who directly participate in hostilities or who oth-
erwise engage in combatant acts.  These individuals do not qualify for [Prisoner of
War] status and may be prosecuted for their unlawful acts.” See OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 17 (emphasis added).  CIA personnel, if directly partici-
pating in hostilities (an armed conflict) as civilians, are subject to being categorized as
unlawful combatants.
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right is premised on a State’s perception of a necessity to respond to a
threat that is “instantaneous, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means or moment of deliberation.”34  That is, a State possesses an in-
herent right to use force to counter what it deems to be an imminent
threat to its security interests.  There has long existed a consensus
among States and international lawyers that an imminent threat is one
that constitutes a concrete and immediate danger—readily evidenced
by the relevant actions engaged in by a State or individuals posing
such a threat.35  However, as in the case of its construction of a new
form of armed conflict, the U.S. has developed a substantially differ-
ent determinative process to be used in making a decision regarding
the existence of an imminent threat.
A leaked 2011 U.S. Justice Department White Paper offers the most
detailed legal analysis—publicly available—of the U.S. interpretation
and implementation of anticipatory self-defense.  While dealing spe-
cifically with the legal basis for a U.S. use of force against a U.S. citi-
zen, outside the country, it is logical to assume that relevant aspects of
this analysis would apply to the targeting of non-U.S. citizens, as well.
The “White Paper36 sets forth a legal framework for considering the
circumstances in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a
foreign country, outside an area of active hostilities, against a U.S.
citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated
force, that is, an al-Qa’ida leader actively engaged in planning opera-
tions to kill Americans.”37  It then goes on to state that such a use of
force would be lawful only when three conditions are met:  “(1) an
informed, high level official of the U.S. government has determined
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United
States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3)
the operation . . . [is] conducted in a manner consistent with applicable
. . . [LOAC] principles.”38
An assessment of these conditions established for the exercise of
this U.S. view of anticipatory self-defense must begin with this obser-
vation.  Target selection conducted under this self-defense theory is, at
least theoretically, not status-driven.  That is, individuals marked for
targeting have not been deemed “unlawful enemy combatant partici-
pants in a global armed conflict with the U.S., a status that would, as
noted previously, purportedly subject such personnel to attack when
34. See MOORE, supra note 19.
35. See supra note 19 (discussing imminent as defined by the “Caroline
Doctrine”).
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA
OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011), available at  http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id.
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and wherever they might be discovered.  Instead, as indicated, individ-
uals targeted in the U.S. exercise of this particular self-defense right
must be determined, by a “high-level U.S. government official,” to
pose an “imminent threat of violent attack against the U.S.”39  This
requirement, in turn, immediately raises the issue as to whether the
U.S. interpretation of imminent—in invoking the right to engage in
anticipatory self-defense—parallels that reflected in currently existing
customary international law.  In brief, it does not.
The Justice Department White Paper states that the requirement
that force only be used to counter an imminent threat “does not re-
quire the U.S. to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S.
persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.”40
Why?  Because such a restrictive definition of imminence “would re-
quire the United States to refrain from action until preparations for an
attack are concluded, [which] would not allow the United States suffi-
cient time to defend itself.”41  This reasoning is said to be based on the
fact that “certain members of al-Qa’ida . . . are continually plotting
attacks, . . . would engage in such attacks regularly [if they] were able
to do so, that the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qa’ida
plots as they are developing, and thus cannot be confident that none is
about to occur . . . .”42  Drawing upon this analysis, the White Paper
concludes that any person deemed an operational leader of al-Qa’ida
or its associated forces represents, per se, an imminent threat, with the
result that the U.S. might target such persons at all times, regardless of
whether it possesses specific knowledge concerning planned future
attacks.43
This novel U.S. re-interpretation of the customary right of anticipa-
tory self-defense is a distinct departure from the currently existing in-
ternational norm.  While one might certainly argue that, in this age of
transnational terrorism, a broader concept of imminence is required,
this U.S.-established basis for adjudging the existence of an imminent
threat takes subjective- and self-serving- threat analysis to an extreme.
In brief, a certain individual may be targeted by the U.S. simply be-
cause—given who he is—he may be deemed to pose a consistent,
ongoing, and, thus, “imminent” threat to the U.S.  This wholesale
modification of the anticipatory self-defense principle obviously gives
rise to any number of questions.  Is not targeting individuals, based on
this analysis, just another form of status-based targeting, rather than
targeting centered on any well-practiced self-defense principle?  Who
is the informed, high-level U.S. government official making these
threat/targeting determinations?  What criteria are used in making a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 8–9.
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decision to target a specific individual or individuals?  And, what are
the procedural requirements for making such a determination?  The
U.S. response:  That is all classified information.  We are confident,
however, that UAV strikes conducted against these individuals consti-
tute legitimate acts of self-defense.  Again, little wonder that such rea-
soning has generated both confusion and criticism regarding U.S.
compliance with current international norms in its employment of
UAVs.
VI. LOAC:  THE “HOW” COMPONENT OF APPLICABLE
USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLES
In setting forth both its ongoing armed conflict and anticipatory self-
defense legal justifications for its use of UAVs in targeting members of
al-Qaeda and its associated forces, the U.S. government has consist-
ently insisted that such strikes are conducted in compliance with the
four fundamental LOAC principles relevant to targeting decisions.44
And, presumably, this claim relates to strikes carried out by both the
U.S. armed forces and the CIA, even though the latter, acting under
Title 50 of the U.S. Code, conducts such strikes as covert activities.
Accordingly, these CIA actions lack transparency—making it difficult
to determine whether the Agency does, in fact, adhere to the same
LOAC targeting principles and process followed by U.S. military
personnel.
The U.S. contention that all of its UAV strikes comply with applica-
ble LOAC targeting principles merits closer examination. Much of the
criticism leveled at the U.S. employment of UAVs has been centered
on the assertion that they have been used to engage in targeted strikes,
such strikes being viewed by some as the equivalent of assassination
or extra-judicial killings. This criticism rings false.  Indeed, there
would be much more of a basis for concern, from a LOAC perspec-
tive, if UAV strikes were not targeted.  This is precisely what the
LOAC principle of distinction, prohibiting indiscriminate targeting, re-
quires.  The real issue, once again, is whether, in the case of many of
the UAV strikes, the individual or individuals struck, constitute legiti-
mate targets.  And, this, of course, returns the overall legal analysis to
the already visited consideration of whether these individuals can,
under currently existing international norms, be viewed as combatant
participants in a global armed conflict with the U.S.—or, alternatively,
as terrorists posing an imminent threat to engage in an attack against
the United States.
The more troubling LOAC matter related to the U.S. employment
of UAVs is that associated with so-called signature strikes, wherein the
U.S. does not target specific individuals, but, instead, groups of indi-
viduals, not positively identified, said to be engaged in suspicious, mil-
44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 7; see also Koh, supra note 21.
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itant-like activity in areas generally under al-Qaeda, Taliban, or even
Yemini insurgent control.45  These types of strikes almost inevitably
run afoul of the basic LOAC targeting principles.  Is the targeting of
these unidentified individuals indispensable to the accomplishment of
a lawful mission?  Is such a strike proportionate in nature?  That is,
given the military advantage expected to be gained, will such an attack
result in an unacceptable level of collateral damage or deaths?  None
of these questions can be answered definitively, given the failure, in
engaging in such attacks, to adhere to that most basic of LOAC target-
ing norms, that of distinction—the requirement to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants.  As a result, contrary to the conten-
tion consistently made by the U.S., these types of strikes cannot, per
se, comply with the basic LOAC principles applicable to the “how”
aspects of UAV employment.
VII. SOVEREIGNTY:  A CASUALTY OF U.S. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR UAV EMPLOYMENT
The concept of sovereignty—the essential foundation upon which
the Westphalian notion of international legal order has been built—is
captured in Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the U.N. Charter:
The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equal-
ity of all its members.46
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.47
As has been discussed, the currently existing international legal
norms dictating when, where, and how a State might resort to the use
of force—and thus employ UAVs in projecting such force—are based
on these codified UN principles and other, limited, customary usages
widely accepted by the international community.  In ignoring these
old law principles in formulating its legal justifications for its UAV
strikes against members of al-Qaeda and its associated forces, the U.S.
has, to a great extent, substantially weakened the stabilizing influence
of the universal belief in the sovereignty of every State—the most fun-
damental of international legal practices.  The result of these U.S. ac-
tions has been well captured in a recent Stimson Task Force Report on
U.S. Drone Policy:
From the perspective of many around the world, the United States
currently appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any per-
son it determines is a member of al-Qaida or its associated forces, in
45. Daniel Bynam, Why Drones Work:  The Case for Washington’s Weapon of
Choice, 92 FOREIGN AFF., No. 4, at 32, 36 (2013).
46. U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 1.
47. Id. at art. 2 para. 4.
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any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret
evidence, evaluated in a secret process by unknown and largely
anonymous individuals—with no public disclosure of which organi-
zations are considered ‘associated forces’ (or how combatant status
is determined . . .), no means for anyone outside that secret process
to raise questions about the criteria or validity of the evidence, and
no means for anyone outside that process to identify or remedy mis-
takes or abuses.48
Or—as succinctly stated by a commentator on the subject of U.S.
drone use:
At the moment, the United States itself—as the globe’s only mili-
tary superpower—is the sole arbiter of its own actions:  with zero
transparency, it determines which laws apply, and it comes up with
its own interpretation of core concepts.  Or, to put it in more famil-
iar terms, the United States is judge, jury, and executioner, all rolled
into one.  It decides how to interpret the law to which it is subject; it
decides what can be counted as evidence and how to evaluate that
evidence; and, ultimately, it kills.49
The accuracy of these synopses of the minimal concern displayed by
the U.S. for the role of sovereignty in its UAV targeting process is
evidenced in the form of yet another of its decision-making mecha-
nisms.  U.S. officials have repeatedly indicated that the United States
will use force in the territory of another State only if that State is
unable or unwilling to effectively deal with what the U.S. has adjudged
to be a threat posed by a certain individual or individuals, located in
that State.  Yet, in the final analysis, it will be the U.S. that engages in
a unilateral determination as to whether a third State has, in fact,
proven to be unable or unwilling to suppress the threat in issue—a
decision that may, or may not, be substantially supported by demon-
strable evidence.  Thus, if the U.S. makes a determination that an indi-
vidual present in State X poses an imminent threat to U.S. security
interests; makes a request that State X deal with this threat; State X
makes an independent assessment that the individual in issue poses no
such threat, and, therefore, refuses to consent to the U.S. targeting of
this individual; the U.S. may then simply declare that State X has
proven to be, ipso facto, unwilling or unable to meet its international
obligations.  Consequently, UAV strikes follow.
The U.S. may deem this disregard for the concept of sovereignty
essential, currently, in order to thwart terrorist threats to U.S. secur-
ity.  The UAV targeting of individuals in third States, absent the con-
sent, and against the will of, these States, however, is certain to
establish a use of force precedent that can only serve to significantly
eviscerate a principle of international law that has served as the
48. STIMSON CENTER, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
U.S. DRONE POLICY 37 (June 2014).
49. Brooks, supra note 7, at 96–97.
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lynchpin for stability within the global community.  In doing so, the
U.S. may well be sacrificing the possibility of achieving future strate-
gic goals for the ability to strike contemporary tactical objectives.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been twofold:  (1) to demonstrate
that the currently existing international norms regulating a State’s use
of force—if not ignored, misinterpreted, or misapplied—are fully ca-
pable of dictating when, where, and how the U.S. might employ UAVs
in pursuing its national security interests and (2) to shift the criticism
surrounding the UAV from the weapon platform, itself, to those who
have formulated highly questionable legal justifications for its
employment.
As has been shown, it is not that existing use of force principles do
not, and cannot, apply to the U.S. use of UAVs; it is that the U.S. has
intentionally chosen not to apply these long practiced norms to its em-
ployment of these weapon systems.  Instead, it has formulated novel,
dual, legal justifications for their use—legal theories grounded on,
first, the creation of a completely new form of armed conflict, and,
secondly, a dubious re-interpretation of an existing customary self-de-
fense norm.  It is these alternatively issued legal justifications, result-
ing in the application of different legal regimes, with divergent legal
considerations, that have generated the confusion surrounding the law
applicable to U.S. UAV use, as well as the doubt concerning the con-
tinued viability of attempting to apply currently existing use of force
principles to this 21st century technology.  And, it is these newly
minted legal justifications, rather than the UAV, per se, that have
largely given rise to the intense criticism of the latter’s use.
For U.S. policy makers, when considering a UAV strike, the ques-
tion posed has thus become:  Which of my two legal justifications
available to me best supports U.S. security interests in this particular
situation—at this specific point in time?  That is, is it best, in this case,
to categorize my intended target(s) as unlawful combatants or ter-
rorists?  Again, little wonder that uncertainty surrounding the credi-
bility of the existing use of force norms and criticism of the U.S. use of
UAVs exist.  Well established international principles have generally
been subjected to a consistent U.S. shell game of legal theories—ap-
plied exclusively on the basis of opportunistic interests and policy con-
siderations, rather than as a matter of law.
Why has the U.S. government resorted to the formulation of legal
justifications for its employment of UAVs that are so transparently
questionable in nature?  In a final analysis of this matter, the answer is
relatively evident. The characteristics of this weapon platform simply
make it too easy, too attractive for the U.S. to engage in the use of
force in situations where it would not have done so in the past.  There
exists no risk to personnel or to a piloted aircraft; the targeting is both
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more deliberate and accurate, with the resulting benefit that any col-
lateral damage and casualties can be minimized.  The danger that re-
sides in the allure of engaging in such thinking, of course, is that it is
just this ease, this obvious attractiveness of UAV employment, that has
fostered the necessity for the U.S. government to abandon the existing
international norms applicable to the use of UAVs and to create
strained, self-serving, and, potentially, precedent-setting legal justifi-
cations for the very use of force itself.
